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I. Introduction

Standing on the rim o f San Rafael Swell, a visitor to southern Utah can see the
contours o f red sandstone open up across the horizon for almost sixty miles. A single paved
road travels through a landscape o f dry washes, desert flats, and sandstone mesa. Like many
rem ote areas o f the West, the region is almost all federally owned, and because o f this, has
been embroiled in a battle for decades. The issues at stake are not new to the West; debate
over appropriate use o f federal lands has been the center piece o f western conflict for almost
as long as people have settled the region.

Citizens o f Emer>' County, however, have

proposed the San Rafael Swell National Heritage Act as an alternative to years o f conflict.
The Act outlines land managem ent guidelines for the region, which according to the
designers o f the Act, protects the region’s unique qualities while at the same time providing
econom ic benefits for the local com m unity. The citizens o f Emery County see the Act as
their opportunity to m anage the land locally.
The process that led to the Act is unclear, and at this point, it is too early to offer any
substantive evaluation. The importance o f this Act, however, is that it represents a major
shift in the approach to public land and natural resource m anagem ent percolating across
the West. States such as Utah, are poised at the beginning o f a pow er shift—a shift from
centralized m anagem ent o f public lands' to more localized, collaborative decision making

See Donald Snow, E m pire or H om elands? A R evival o f Jeffersonian D em ocracy in the
Am erican fVest, in The Next West: Public lands. C om m unity and Economy in the
A m erican W est 181, 185 (John A. Baden & Donald Snow eds.) (1997) [hereinafter The
1
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am ong diverse interests.* Rural communities, at one time the center o f public land
debates, are helping to drive this new movement^ as diverse interests such as loggers and
conservationists join together to resolve contentious public land issues."^ This Paper
addresses the question o f whether these efforts, often described as "collaborative decision
m ak in g ” or “collaborative groups,” are appropriate for public land decision making. It
also seeks to explore the proper legal and political boundaries o f their authority.
Collaborative groups are defined as “the deliberate use o f unusual coalitions to
work on natural resource and environmental issues.”^ Collaborative decision making has
also been described as “environmental dem ocracy.” Environmental democracy
entails wider involvement by local communities and lay persons and the
introduction o f more di\'erse types o f information in the decision making process
for protecting the environment, has received increasing support.^

Next West].

See Barb Cestero, Beyond the Hundredth Meeting: A Field Guide to Collaborative
Conservation on the W est’s Public Lands 3 (1999) [hereinafter Cestero].
3

See id.
A

See id at 63.
5
Donald Snow, speech at “Com ing Together on the Land: Evaluating Collaborative
Process in Natural Resource M anagem ent.” Collaboration: A Threat or Menace, at 2
(1998) [hereinafter Snow].
A
Kris W em stedt, Terra Firm a or Terra Incognita'^ Western L a n d Use, H azardous
waste, an d the D evolution o f U.S. F ederal E nvironm ental Program s. Natural Resource
Journal, 2000.
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Generally, these groups are comprised o f former adversaries or ‘“coalitions o f the unalikc’
. . , such as Trout Unlimited members, hydro power producers and irrigation district
leaders."' Com m only, collaborative groups address issues o f both local and national
c o n c e r n / such as controlling the impacts o f recreation on desert landscapes in southern
Utah.’’ W hile some collaborative groups chose to negotiate formal agreements, often
submitting m anagem ent proposals to federal agencies for possible ratification,'^ other
collaborative groups see their role as informative, educating the public on the
implications o f natural resource decisions." W hile the issues and organizational
structures m ay differ between groups, the driving forces are universal—more
collaborative, local planning that considers the needs o f citizens most directly affected by
public land m anagem ent decisions.'*
Local participation, however, does not mean local control. Because m any o f the

See Snow, supra note 5 at 2.
8

See id.
The Canyon County Partnership, a coalition o f federal m anagem ent agencies and state
and county government from around Moab, Utah, joined together to develop a
m anagem ent plan to address the boom in recreation that threatens the fragile desert
landscape o f southern Utah. See Cestero, supra note 7, at 57.
!U
See id.
11
See id.
12
See id.
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com m unities across the West are surrounded by public lands, the issues are likely to
involve national concerns as well.*’ Therefore, successful collaborati\ e groups often
inelude national representatives, such as the Defenders o f Wildlife, working alongside
local citizens.''^
The difference between legal authority and political pow er is fundamental to
defining the limits o f collaboration and has led to debates over the usefulness o f
collaborative groups in public land decision making.*^ Advocates describe this
phenom ena as an experiment in new governance, a revival o f Jeffersonian democracy in
which local citizens engage in the decisions that affect them directly.'^ Advocates also
argue that collaborative groups em body “the devolution o f real pow er to the citizenry, and
the creation o f new institutions o f responsibility to manage that pow er.’"' As public land

13
Sec Snow, supra note 5. at 2.
14

See Cestero, supra note 2, at 63.
15
Sec g en era lly George C. Coggins, "D evolution in F ederal L a n d Law: Abdication by A ny
O ther N am e . . . , 3 Hastings W.-N.W.J.Envtl. L. & P ol’y 211 (1996) (discussing lack o f
legal and political fram ework for collaboration and devolution)[hereinafter Coggins,
D evolution in F ederal L a n d Law]\ George C. Coggins, R egulating F ederal N atural
Resources: A Sum m ary Case A gainst D evolved Collaboration, 25 Ecology L.Q. 602
(1999) (criticizing collaboration efforts on public lands)[hereinafter Coggins, Regulating
F ederal N a tu ra l Resources]\ Cestero, supra note 6 (discussing collaborative decision
m aking on public lands).
I6

S ee The Next West, supra note 1, at 185.
17

Id.
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m anagem ent enters a state o f flux,'* collaborative decision m aking offers an alternative to
traditional interest group advocacy in which "single-issue advocacy and user groups
com pete for influence over agency decisions.'""
Critics, however, fear that this m ovem ent is another ploy by pro- development
forces to capture the decision m aking process, particularly as changes in land
m anagem ent are less favorable to traditional public land uses.'" At its core, critics argue,
collaborative decision m aking runs counter to the policies underlying public land laws:
federal agencies are generally prohibited from delegating m anagem ent authority,
particularly to a small cadre o f local citizens."' For instance. Professor George Coggins, a
legal scholar on public land issues in the West, has vociferously condemned collaborative
decision m ak in g ." W hile he acknowledges that federal laws allow agencies wide latitude
to im plem ent m anagem ent objectives, he argues that collaborative decision making

IS

See id.
Cestero, supra note 2, at 4.
:o
See Coggins, ‘'D evolution in F ederal L and Law, supra note 15, at 211.
21

See g enerally Coggins, D evolution in Federal L and Law, supra note 15 (discussing
lack o f legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution); Coggins,
R eg ulating F ederal N atural Resources, supra note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on
public lands).
Sec g en era lly Coggins, D evolution in F ederal L a n d Law, supra note 15 (discussing
lack o f legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution); Coggins,
R eg ulating F ederal N a tural Resources, supra note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on
public lands).
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exceeds these limits."^ Instead o f resolving contentious issues, he asserts, collaboration is
m erely an abdication o f managem ent responsibilities by federal land m anagers.-■* In fact,
Coggins reasons that federal bureaucrats only embrace the collaborative process because
it allows them to “[pass] the buck on difficult and controversial allocation issues.”*''
In spite of, or m aybe in part because of, the debate surrounding the appropriate
legal and political framework o f collaborative decision making, collaborative groups are
becom ing increasingly ensconced across the West.*^ However, collaborative decision
m aking is a recent phenom ena in the public land arena*' and, therefore, the proper
boundaries o f this type o f decision making remain unclear.** Court decisions and
congressional action frame different, and often inconsistent approaches to collaborative
decision making. In late 1998. Congress attached a rider to the omnibus spending bill,
which mandated that the United States Forest Serv ice im plem ent a locally initiated
citizen proposal for managing an area o f land that included almost three national forest in

See Coggins, D evolution in F ederal L a n d L a \\\ supra note 15, at 211.
See Coggins, D evolution in F ederal L a n d Law , supra note 15, at 211.
25
Coggins, Regulating F ederal N atural Resources, supra note 15 at 603.
2f.
See Lisa Jones, Howdy, N eighbor! As a Last Resort, W esterners Start Talking To Each
Other, High Country News, M ay 13. 1996. 28(9), at 1, 6 -8 ; The Next West, supra note
at 186.
27

See The Next West, supra note 1, at 186.
2S

See infra Part III (discussing legal scope o f collaboration).

6
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the Sierra mountains o f northern C a l i f o r n i a . I n contrast, less than a year later, in a
decision o f first impression, the D.C. Circuit Court held, in N ational Park and
Conse}'\>ation Association v. Stanton,^*' that the National Park Service unlaw fully
delegated its statutory authority to m anage the Niobrara Wild and Scenic River to a local
council.-' Because o f these conflicting authorities, a uniform standard for collaborative
decision m aking is unclear.
This Paper suggests that while collaborative decision m aking must be approached
cautiously,-* it offers a workable approach to expanding public participation in allocating
federally owned natural resources. However, defining the legal boundaries o f
collaborative involvement in decision m aking is critical. As such, I suggest that
Congress’s decision to legislate a locally designed management proposal in California is
politically and legally unsupportable and runs counter to the purpose o f federal land laws.
Congressional legislation that bypasses federally mandated decision making expands
collaboration decision m aking beyond appropriate levels and, therefore, should be
discouraged. Conversely, the D.C. Circuit C o urt’s holding in N ational P ark and

19

See infra Part III (discussing congressional legislation o f citizen initiated management
plan).
30

54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
31
Sec infra Part IV (discussing legal boundaries o f collaborative decision making
authority).
32

See Snow, supra note 5, at 2.
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C o n se n ’ation A ssociation v. Stanton unduly limits collaborative decision making through
its narrow interpretation o f the "unlawful sub delegation doctrine.

'

As an alternative to these approaches. I recom m end that the appropriate legal
boundaries for collaborative decision making center on three issues: (1 ) collaborative
groups m ust comply with existing public lands laws; (2) agencies must be allowed
flexibility under the sub delegation doctrine to interpret final reviewing authority; and (3)
collaborative decision making must consider national as well as local interest.
Part II o f this Paper outlines the evolution o f collaborative decision making on
public lands; it discusses the political and legal changes in public land management that
led to the rise in collaborative decision making. Part III addresses the tension between the
courts and Congress, and outlines the legal boundaries o f collaborative decision making.
Part VI analyzes both the future o f coliaborali\ e groups as a force in natural resource
decision making, and the confiictiiig legal guidelines addressing the scope o f their
authority. Finally, Part VI concludes that federal regulations should incorporate
collaborative decision making into regulations that guide natural resource allocation.

See infra Part III.A (defining unlawful sub delegation doctrine).
8
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II. Unrest in Public Land States: Laying the Foundation
for Collaborative Decision M aking

The forces driving collaborative decision making are well documented.^'’ Economic,
political, and demographic changes across the W est" have laid the foundation for what
Donald Snow, a scholar and writer on public lands, describes as a "renaissance o f the local.
The following section offers a b rief explanation o f how collaborative decision making
emerged in response to these changes.
A. A C en tio y o f C entralized M anagem ent B egins to Crumble:
The Failure o f Scientific M anagem ent

W hile collaborative decision m aking has spurred widespread debate,'^ critics and
advocates generally agree that it runs counter to public land laws and customs.^* An in-depth

34

See generally Cestero, supra note 2 (discussing collaborative decision making on public
lands); The Swan Valley, infra note OO (discussing collaboration efforts in Swan Valley,
Montana); The Next West, supra note 1 (discussing changes in western politics,
demographics, and economy).
35

See The Next West, supra note 1, at 185.
3ft
See The Next West, supra note 1, at 185.
37

See supra Part I (discussing collaboration generally); see generally Coggins, D evolution
in F ederal L a n d Law. supra note 15 (discussing lack o f legal and political framework for
collaboration and devolution); Coggins, R egulating F ederal N atural Resources, supra
note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on public lands).
38
See Snow, supra note 5, at 8; see generally Coggins, D evolution in Federal L and Law.
supra note 15 (discussing lack o f legal and political framework for collaboration and
devolution); Coggins, R egulating F ederal natural Resources, supra note 15 (criticizing
collaboration efforts on public lands).
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discussion o f the failures o f scientific m anagem ent are beyond the scope o f this paper.
However, a b rief discussion highlights the emergence o f collaborative decision making as
a response to the failure o f scientific m anagem ent to allocate natural resources. Historically,
centralized decision making has been the driving force behind m anagem ent o f public lands
and natural r e s o u r c e s .P r e s id e n t Theodore Roosevelt, with the help o f Gifford Pinchot, the
first c h ie f o f the Forest Service, im plemented a centralized m anagem ent system based on
Progressive Era ideals o f governance; technocrats and experts regulate the allocation o f
natural resources, therefore, removing the decision making process from the public forum.
W hile this system remains the foundation o f public land m anagem ent today,"*" critics have
argued that centralized m anagem ent has failed."*' Instead o f Roosevelt’s vision o f a de
politicized decision m aking process, “the heavy hand o f politics [can be seen] on virtually
every m ajor decision made by the land and water agencies.
Economists and political scientists are equally critical o f centralized management.

See g enerally Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel o f Efficiency: The
Progressive Conservation M ovement, 1890-1920 (1959) (discussing the rise o f
Progressivism and the effect on scientific, centralized management o f public land); Paul
W. Hirt, A Conspiracy o f Optimism: M anagem ent o f the National Forests Since World
W ar Two (1994) (analyzing Forest Service history); Caw ley R. McGreggor, Federal
Land, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics (1993)
(discussing history o f federal land management in West).
40
S ee g en era lly Hirt, supra note 39 (analyzing Forest Service history).
41

See The Next West, supra note 1, at 185.
42

See T he N ext West, supra note 1, at 192.
10
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Robert Nelson, an expert on public land reform and resource economics, argues that federal
land m anagem ent agencies are forced to '“do the wrong t h i n g . A g e n c y budgets are
attached to pro-developm ent schemes and most o f the guiding statutes are antiques,
“holdover[s] from the earliest years o f the century, when prom oting western development
was regarded as an unqualified holy."'" Finally, “the call for greater local involvement in
federal environmental decision making . ., has arisen from the perceived inability o f purely
scientific and technical endeavors to adequately frame and answer environmental
questions.
By the 1990’s, federal land m anagem ent agencies were caught in the middle o f an
unprecedented controversy: environmentalists condem ned the agencies’ environmentally
destructive, but legislatively driven policies, while industry' and development interests
accused the agencies o f sanctioning the decreasing em phasis on multiple use.'**' Although
m ost interests involved in public lands agree that reforming centralized managem ent is
necessary, the shape o f this reform remains unclear.'^'

43

See The Next West, supra note 1, at 191.
44

See The Next West, supra note 1, at 191.
43
Kris W em stedt, Terra F irm a or Terra hicoguiia? Western L and Use, H azardous Waste,
an d the D evolution o f U.S. F ederal Environm ental Program s, Natural Resource Journal,
2000 .
45

See Hirt, supra note 39, at xv.
47

See The N ext West, supra note 1, at 190-94.

11
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B. Fertile P olitical Ground: the C hanging
P olitical Landscape o f the fVest

The changing political atmosphere o f the West has also contributed to the emergence
o f collaborative groups.'*’^Collaborative decision making, in large part, was a response to the
political gridlock that evolved out o f the environmental activism o f the 1960s and early
19 7 0 s/'' During these years, environmentalists had been profoundly successful at galvanizing
westerners in support o f environmental issues/'^ However, the 1980s were plagued by
political backlash and by the m iddle o f the decade, environmentalists struggled to retain their
advances."' Ironically, while public support rose for anti-environmental factions, federal
policies continued to de- emphasize development on public lands. By the beginning o f the
1990s, the ramifications o f these events could be seen in rural communities across the
W est—stories o f resource dependent towns struggling with shrinking timber sales and
mistrust o f federal agency managem ent agendas are well d o cum en ted .- Against this
backdrop, m any environmentalists, as well as resource interests, began looking for more

48
See The Next West, supra note 1, at 185.
See Snow, supra note 5, at 3.
See Snow, supra note 5, at 3.
51

See Snow, supra note 5, at 3.
Som e well known examples include Quincy, California, Beaverhead County, Montana,
Swan Valley, Montana, and Applegate Valley, Oregon. See generally Cestero, supra note
6 (discussing examples o f collaboration efforts in West).
12
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productive approaches to address the stalemate that had settled over federal la n d s /'
Environmentalists also began to fear that traditional forms o f politics contributed to
the alienation o f local com m unities/^ It became apparent that citizens were disillusioned
with the litigious and regulator)' approach to environmental p ro te c tio n /' in which local
citizens had been “dealt out o f the game by a decades-long battle among communities o f
‘experts.’”'’'' And, over tim e “[a]s the [natural resource] issues seem ed to climb higher into
the stratosphere o f politics, the people who lived closest to the resources in question seemed
to have less and less to do with it all.”-^ Collaborative decision making, it seemed to many,
offered local citizens the opportunity to influence decisions regarding the lands in their
com m unities and provided public land interests groups-'^ the opportunity to approach the
issue o f resource allocation more e f f e c t i v e l y . A s one western governor stated;
We have to show in plain and simple actions that the environment, the economy, and

See Snow supra note 5, at 3.
54
See Inter\'iew with Barb Cestero, Program Associate, Sonoran Institute, in Bozeman,
M ontana (Dec. 4, 1999) [hereinafter Cestero Interv'iew].
55
See The Next West, supra note 5, at 195.
56

Snow, supra note 5, at 5.
57

Snow, supra note 5, at 5.
58

Public land interest groups include resource users such as timer industry representatives,
ranchers, recreationists, miners, preser\^ationists, and wildlife interest groups.
See The N ext West, supra note 1, at 185-86.
13
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the com m unity are compatible. Our citizens are tired o f the judicial gridlock and
they're feeling left out o f the process. They are willing and able to participate. . .

C M ovem ent Toward Increased Public Participation: The
N ational E nvironm ental Protection A ct and
the N ational Forest M anagem ent A ct

Public participation in land managem ent decision making is not ne%. Federal laws
passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s recognized the desire for increased public
involvement in the decision making process.*"^ The National Environmental Protection Act
("NEPA")"^ and the National Forest M anagem ent Act ("NFMA")'^- are the primary laws
guiding public involvement in decisions on federal l a n d s . B o t h the language o f the Acts,
as well as their im plem enting regulations, define traditional approaches to public
participation on federal l a n d s . W h i l e these laws marked a watershed in federal land
m anagem ent by opening up the decision making process to public review, both laws failed
to fully engage the public in the decision making process. This section

See Barb Cestero, From Conflict to Driven? A Social and Political History o f
Environmental Collaboration in the Swan Valley. Montana, 20 (1997) (unpublished M.S.
thesis. University o f M ontana (Missoula)) (on file with University o f M ontana Library)
[hereinafter The Swan Valley].

Jfg 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14 (1994).
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370d (1995).
(.2

16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-14 (1994); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 432l-4370d (1995).
64

See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 18.
14
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provides a b rie f summars' o f the laws and offers a critique o f each Act's failure to fully
engage the public in the decision making process.

1. N a tio n a l E nvironm ental Protection A ct

(a) B ackground
Congress passed N E PA in 1969 against a backdrop o f environmental awareness and
public dem and for increased influence over and access to federal decision making.^- Briefly,
NEPA outlines procedural guidelines for federal agency decision making and includes public
review o f agency d e c i s i o n s . N E P A is considered the first environmental law o f the
environmental age, and was created with the intention o f developing a national policy that
would make federal agencies more sensitive to the ecological impacts o f their decisions.'’"
While the Act is substantively thin, the language outlines lofty ideals for federal
environmental management: “ [t]o declare a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to prom ote efforts that will
prevent or eliminate dam age to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and

See The Swan Valley, supra note 60 at 18 (citing U.S. Congress, O ffice o f Technology'
A ssessm ent, Forest Service Planning: Accomm odation Uses, Producing Outputs and
Sustaining Ecosystems (1992)).
See George Cam eron Coggins et a l . Federal Public Land and Natural Resource Law 333
(3ded. 1993).
fS7

See W endy Nelson Espeland, B ureaucrats and Indians in a Contem porary C olonial
E ncounter, Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2001.
15
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welfare o f m an.”^’^
However, simply declaring that agencies be com m itted to protecting the environment
seemed unlikely to generate change.*'*^ Instead, drafters inserted section 102, which requires
agencies to prepare Environmental Impact Statements (HIS). U nder section 102, agencies
must com plete an EIS before any m ajor federal action, such as perm itting a proposed mine,
takes p la c e /" The EIS, am ong other things, provides a detailed description o f the significant
impacts, predicted outcomes, and environmental and social costs and benefits o f each
alternative. In a significant change from pre-N EPA agency decision making, NEPA allows,
and in fact requires public input and review o f agency decisions through the comment and
appeal process.^' W hile the process is administratively complex, the agencies primarily use
public involvement as a method to gather information and educate the public.’-

(b) B enefits
N E PA has been applauded for opening up the decision making process by requiring

hK
42 U.S.C. 4321.
See W endy Nelson Espeland, Bureaucrats and Indians in a C onteniporaiy Colonial
E ncounter, Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2001.
7(1

See George Cam eron Coggins et al.. Federal Public Land and Natural Resource Law 33335 (3d ecF 1993).
71

See id. at 335.
72

See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 21.
16
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federal agencies to m ake information they considered in the decision making process
available to the public. Advocates o f NEPA contend that this requirement “ensures that the
public, including environmental groups, can play a role in both the decision making process
and the im plementation o f that decision. Publication o f the EIS provides the public with an
assurance that the agency has indeed, considered environmental concerns in its decision
m aking process.”^-’ In fact, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), in its twenty-five
year review o f N E PA concluded that;
Since its enactment, N E PA has significantly increased public information and
input into agency decision-making. N E P A opened up for public scrutiny the planning
and decision-m aking processes o f federal agencies, in m any cases providing the only
opportunity for the public to affect these processes. Partly as a result o f NEPA, public
knowledge o f and sophistication on environmental issues have significantly increased
over the last 25 years. So too ha\'e public dem ands for effective and timely
involvement in the agency decision-making processes.

(c) C hallenges
Despite N E P A ’s innovations and its successes, N E P A ’s limitations are well
documented. Although its goal was to promote positive environmental policies, the law

73

Frona M. Powell, The North Am erican Com m ission F or E nvironm ental Cooperation 's
San Pedro Report: A Case Study and A nalysis o f the C E C Process, En\ironm ental
Lawyer, June 2000.
74

Id.
17
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does not require agencies to chose environmentally superior alternatives/^ Instead. NEPA
m erely requires agencies to comply with the EIS process. In fact, the United States Supreme
Court has determined that N E PA is a procedural, rather than substantive law.’’'’ A ccording!),
“ if the adverse environmental effects o f the proposed action are adequately identified and
evaluated, the agenc)' is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outw eigh
the environmental costs. . . N E PA m erely prohibits uniformed rather than unwise agency
action.” ’^
Perhaps, m ore importantly in the context o f collaborative decision making, NEPA
has also been criticized for its failure to engage the public in meaningful ways.^^ Jonathon
Poisner, Professor o f Law, argues that the Act and its regulations curtail meaningful public
involvem ent in the decision making process. The laws do not specifically require the agency
to actively involve citizens m the decision making process. Instead, they obligate the agency
to merely consider environmental impacts and demonstrate by fully disclosing these impacts
that they considered them. Therefore, although the law designates specific guidelines to

75

See W endy Nelson Espeland, B ureaucrats and Indians in a C ontem porajy Colonial
Encounter, Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2001.
76
Frona M. Powell, The North Am erican Com m ission F or Environm ental C ooperation's
San P edro Report: A Case Study and Analysis o f the C E C Process, En\'ironmental
Lawyer, June 2000.
' f d.
^^See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 19.
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inform the public, responsibility for project development is retained by the agency/'' Many
critics also argue that an institutional desire to protect agency discretion is at the root o f these
procedures. The result, then, is a public that is not engaged in m aking the decisions but is
merely reviewing the decision already m ade by the agency.

Agencies are "solely

responsible for developing the proposed project, conducting all necessary' analysis, and
providing citizens with pertinent inform ation.”'^" Agencies retain considerable discretion for
the methods and timing o f public involvement.'^' Consequently, public participation is stalled
at the input level o f the decision m aking continuum.
Similarly, another critic observed;
that attempts to involve agency and public collaboration in the NEPA process has not
worked well. Citizens often feel that decisions have already been made. Parties
generally report being surprised and not consulted until the process is well underway,
by which time it is difficult to influence its direction. The final, serious flaw that
critics point out is NEPA's lack o f attention to the human dimensions o f the decision
m aking process. The social, economic and cultural effects o f decisions are seldom.

Jonathan Poisner, A C ivic Republican Perspective on the N ational Environm ental Policy
A ct's P rocess for Citizen Participation. 26 Envtl. L. 53, 54-55 (1996) (stating that NEPA
led to an unprecedented level o f citizen participation in environmental decisionmaking,
spawning a great national experiment in participatory pluralism);
so
See The Swan Valley, supra note 60. at 19. (citing Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the
E m erging Concept o f Ecosystem M anagem ent on the P ublic Lands. Land and Water
Review X X V (1): 43-60).
See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 19.
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or al least not systematically, considered as required by N E P A /Finally, although these criticisms refer to the limitations o f public participation in
Endangered Species Act, these observations resonate with NEPA:
Public notice, comment, and hearings tend to limit citizens to reacting to proposals
already developed. Collaborative decision-making, or interactive participation, which
includes stakeholders in "face-to-face problem solving," offers greater opportunities
for creative public involvement. This is particularly true in planning, where panels
or working groups m ay m eet periodically to identify information needs, raise issues,
propose new approaches, or monitor progress.

In conclusion, NEPA has failed to engage the public in the decision making process.
According to Poisner, "N E P A fails as a means for encouraging deliberative democracy. . .
. As a result, N E P A ’s citizen participation generates more heat than light, creating citizen
participation pathologies that leave both citizens and agencies frustrated by the process.” '"*

(d) The N ext Step: Collaboration and NEPA
Supporters o f collaboratives recognize the importance o f reconciling collaborativ e

Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the N ational Environm ental Policy
A ct's P rocess for C itizen Participation. 26 Envtl. L. 53. 54-55 ( 1996).
Robert L. Fischman and Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson fo r Conservation From Pollution
C ontrol Law: C ooperative Federalism for Recovery under the E ndangered Species Act.
Colum bia Journal o f Environmental Law, 2002 (internal citations omitted).
S4

Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the N ational Environm ental Policy
A ct's P rocess fo r C itizen Participation. 26 Envtl. L. 53, 54-55 (1996).
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decision m aking with NEPA:
currently there is growing interest in finding ways to m ake the "NEPA process" more
collaborative across not only federal agencies, but also state and local agencies,
non-governm ent

associations (NGO),

and

private

landowners.

. . Indeed,

collaboration, collaborative planning, ecosystem m anagem ent, and sustainability are
all com m on terms o f reference in environmental policy today and when one searches
the roots o f this change, one returns to the simple words o f NEPA.'^^

I f N E P A ’s ability to institute ecologically sound decisions is limited, how then can
a colloborative approach fit into exiting N E PA guidelines? The intersection between NEPA
and collaborative decision m aking will be integral to developing a workable framework for
collaboration.

2. The N ational Forest M anagem ent Act

While the National Forest M anagem ent Act ( “N F M A ”) is less important to this
discussion, however, a b rief discussion is n e c e s s a r y .N F M A was passed by Congress in
1976, legislated unprecedented restraints on the Forest Service^^ as well as providing for

85

M argaret A. Shannon, Will NEPA he “An A genda fo r the Future " Or Will It Becom e “A
R equiem F o r the Past
A B ook Review o f the N ational Environm ental Policy Act: An
A genda F or the Future. Buffalo Environmental Law ,loumal. Fall, 2000).
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16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614(1994).

87

See Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future o f
the West 144-45 (1992).
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public participation in Forest Serv'ice m anagem ent/^ Generally, NTMA guides Forest
Ser\dce land use planning by directing the Secretary o f Agriculture to de\elo p
comprehensive, long range management plans (referred to as forest plans) for each national
forest/'^ All m anagem ent decisions, therefore, must be consistent with these p l a n s . S i m i l a r
to N E PA , N F M A also affirmed citizens’ right to review Forest S e n ice decision making and
contains specific language regarding public participation.’” Specifically, N FM A requires
“public participation in the development, review, and revision o f land m anagem ent plans
including, but not limited to, making the plans or revisions available to the public . . . the
Secretary shall publicize and hold public meetings . . . that foster public participation.’”^*
However, similar to the public participation components contained in NEPA, N FM A also
fails to engage citizens in the decision making process/^
3. The F ederal A d v iso n ' C om m ittee Act

See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 19.
See George Cameron Coggins et ah. Federal Public Land and Natural Resource Law (3d
ed. 1993k
4(1
See id.
VI

See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 19.

1 6 U .S .C .A .§ 1604(d) (1994).
See The Swan Valley, supra note 60, at 23.
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W hile an in depth discussion o f the Federal A dvisor) Com m ittee Act (FACA) is
beyond the scope o f this Paper, it is important to touch on it briefly. F AC A was original!)
designed to control the influence o f special interest groups on federal ad\ isor)' committees.
The Act requires that federal advisory com mittees have balanced memberships, open
meetings, public access to m eeting minutes, and limits on the amount o f committees
formed''"^. Historically, this law has been viewed as a legal roadblock to agency participation
in collaborative decision making. One author argues that the sweep o f lawsuits against
federal agencies created a “FA C A -phobia.”'^- However, both the federal agencies and the
local, com m unity groups overestim ated F A C A ’s restrictions.

The outcome o f a series o f

lawsuits by environmentalists alleging that agency participation in community-collabortaive
groups violated FA C A seem to indicate that F AC A does not inhibit the development o f
collaborative groups."’ In Public Citizen v. United States D ep't o f J u s tic e ^ the court stated
that FA C A applies only to groups "organized b ) , or closely tied to, the [f]edera!

W
4
Thom as C. Beierle and Rebecca J. Long, C hilling Collaboration: The F ederal Advisory'
C om m ittee A ct and Stakeholder Involvem ent in E nvironm ental D ecisionm aking,
Environmental Law Reporter, July 1999).
S'5
Sean T. McAllister, The C onfluence o f a River and a Com munity: An Experim ent with a
C om m unitv-B ased W atershed M anagem ent in Southw estern Colorado, University o f
D enver W ater Law Review, Spring 2000.

Id.
491 U.S. 440, 461 (1989) (It was not the intent o f FACA to bring all “private advisory
com m ittees within F A C A ’s terms. . . [and is] "limited to groups organized by, or closely
tied to, the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status.” ).
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[gjovem m ent, and thus enjoying a quasi-public status."’’'^ Therefore, collaborati\ e efforts
that are “consultative forms o f public involvement,” do not trigger FACA. '

48
Id.
Thom as C. Beierle and Rebecca J. Long, C hilling CollaboraHon: The Federal A dvisory
C om m ittee A c t a n d Stakeholder Involvem ent in E nvironm ental D ecision M aking.
Environm ental Law Reporter (1999).
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III. The Legal Scope o f Collaboration: Tensions Betw een
the C ou p and Congress.

Court decisions and congressional action frame different and often inconsistent
approaches to public participation in natural resource decision making. Therefore, a
discussion o f these authorities outlines the legal parameters that surround collaboration.
Because defining the legal scope o f collaboration is fundamentally a question o f determining
the acceptable levels o f authority an agency may delegate to a citizen g r o u p , a discussion
o f the unlawful sub delegation doctrine provides an appropriate starting point. Following
that. Part III addresses the D C . Circuit C ourt’s interpretation o f the unlawful sub delegation
doctrine in N a tional P ark and C o n sen a tio n A ssociation v. Stanton'^’^ as it applies to local
decision m aking on National Park Service land. Finally, Part 111 ends with a discussion o f
C ongress’ decision to mandate legislatively a citizen initiated managem ent proposal.

A. C onstitutional Restraints to Local D ecision M aking:
U nlawful Sub D elegation D octrine

The Constitution delegates exclusively to Congress the power to make necessar>' and

Ii)i.)
See g en era lly Coggins, D evolution in F ederal L and Law, supra note 15 (discussing lack
o f legal and political framework for collaboration and devolution); Coggins. Regulating
F ederal N a tu ra l Resources, supra note 15 (criticizing collaboration efforts on public
lands).
Mil

54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
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proper rules for governing federal property.’®- In response to this mandate. Congress has
delegated regulatory power to four main federal land m anagem ent agencies-the Forest
Serv ice, the Bureau o f Land Management, the National Park Serv ice, and the Fish and
Wildlife Service.'®-'
The unlawful delegation doctrine addresses delegation from Congress to an agency,''’
and the unlawful sub delegation doctrine outlines the limits o f the agencies' ability to
delegate decision m aking authority to citizens.'®"' The law is well established that Congress
may, without violating the unlawful delegation doctrine, grant authority to an executive
agency to adopt rules and regulations, as long as it provides some "intelligible principle" by
which the agency is to exercise that authority. Therefore, Congress must delegate to the
executive branch the authority to manage federal property.'®- Congressional delegation is
com m on, and in fact, was upheld as early as 1911, when the United States Supreme Court
decided U nited States v, G riniaiidU '’ Similarly, ihe Court has allowed “implied” delegations

102
S ee U.S. Const, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
103

See Coggins, R egulating F ederal N atural Resources, supra note 15 (citing George C.
Cogains
& Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural Resource Law (Supp. 1990)).
)gî
104

See N a tio n al P ark a n d C o n s e n ’ation A ss d. v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp.2d 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1999)
(citing Perot v. Federal Election Com m 'n, 97 F.3d 553, 557 (D C. Cir. 1996)).
10?
M istretta v. U nited States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, (1989) (quoting T. IT. Hampton, Jr.
V. U nited States, 276 U.S. 394, 406,(1928)).
lOtj
220 U.S. 506 (1911) (“Congress m ay certainly delegate to others powers which the
legislature m ay rightfully exercise its e lf ” )
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Co.

by congressional acquiescence.'*^^
However, the courts have interpreted the unlawful sub delegation doctrine to prohibit
agencies from delegating their authority to implement a statute to a prix ate entity.'*’" When
Congress vests an agency with the authority to administer a statute, the agency may not shift
that responsibility to a private entity, particularly when the entity’s subjectivity is
questionable due to conflicts o f interest.'"'' However, in some instances. Congress may allow
agencies to delegate their authority.""

Below is a discussion o f the limited case law

addressing the doctrine o f unlawful delegation.
P erot

F ederal Election Com m ission outlines the parameters o f proper delegation

by an agency to a private entity. In Perot, the Federal Election Committee, a federal agency,
issued a regulation permitting eligible non- profit organizations to host candidate debates.

IU7

See U nited States i’. M idw est OiL 236 U.S. 459 (1915) ( an implied grant o f power to
preserve the public interest would arise out o f . . . congressional acquiescence.” ).
lus
See N a tional Park an d C o n se n ’ation Ass n., 54 F. Supp.2d at IS (citing Perot v. Federal
Election C o m m ’n, 97 F.3d 553, 557 (D C. Cir. 1996)). While courts generally refer to the
doctrine as the “unlawful sub delegation doctrine,” the N ational P ark and C o n se n ’ation
A ssociation court referred to it as the “doctrine o f unlawful delegation” for simplicity
purposes. Id.
109
See id. at 18 (citing Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962 (5th Cir. 1983)); see also
P erot 1’. F ederal E lection Com m'n, 97 F.3d 553, 559 (D C .C ir.1996). Cf. A.L.A.
S chechter P o id tty Corp. v. U nited States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 55 S.Ct. 837, 846, 79 L.Ed.
1570(1935).
I Kl

U nited States v. W iddowson, 916 F.2d 587, 592 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (“ [t]he relevant inquiry in any delegation challenge is
whether Congress intended to permit the delegatee to delegate the authority conferred by
C o n gress")).
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provided, however, that the private entities employ "pre-established objective criteria" to
determine w ho m ay participate. The court reasoned that:
[rjather than m andating a single set o f "objective criteria" all staging organizations
m ust follow, the FEC gave the individual organizations leeway to decide what
specific criteria to use. (Citations omitted.) One might view this as a "delegation,"
because the organizations must use their discretion to formulate objective critena
they think will conform with the agency's definition o f that term. But in that respect,
virtually any regulation o f a private party could be described as a "delegation" o f
authority, since the party must normally exercise some discretion in interpreting what
actions it m ust take to comply.

It does not follow, argued the court, that merely because the agency did not “spell out
precisely” w hat the term “objective criteria” means, it unlawfully delegated its authority. In
fact, the authority to determine what the term "objective criteria" means ultimately rests with
the agency, and as such, the agency m ay determine, that a private parties criteria is not
objective. Therefore, the court held that the agency did not unconstitutionally delegate
legislative authority to private interests.
In fact, in Sierra Club v. Lynn,^^' the court found that “ [i]n the absence o f bad faith
or misplaced reliance, an agency faced with num erous applications for assistance and
endow ed with finite internal resources to implement congressional policy cannot be expected
to ignore useful and relevant information merely because it emanates from an applicant.”
However, the court emphasized, that this does not mean that an agency may substitute

111
:th
502 F.2d 42 (5‘^
Cir. 1974.)
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private entity's “efforts and analysis” for its own.
It appears that the case law allows sub delegation o f authorit} to pri\ ate sectors in
cases where the agency retains final reviewing authority.

Courts have interpreted the scope

o f final reviewing authority broadly. United B lack Fund, Inc. v. Hampton,^''^ outlines a
standard o f appropriate reviewing authority. The facts are these: Plaintiff, United Black
Fund, is a nonprofit charitable corporation, which raises funds for local health and welfare
agencies in inner-city W ashington, D C. Plaintiff applied to the Chairm an o f the United
States Civil Service C om m ission (“the Chairm an” ) for solicitation privileges in the
“C om bined Federal C am paign,” an annual fund drive by several charities. The Chairman
denied P la in tiff s request, explaining that an Executive Order directed the Chairman o f the
Civil Service Com m ission to m ake arrangements that would allow voluntary health and
welfare agencies to solicit funds. Based on this Order, the Greater W ashington Area was a
"federated comm unity," and as such, a federation o f local voluntary agencies belonging to
United W ay o f America, Inc. (“United W ay” ) was participating in the Campaign as an
umbrella group. Local agencies wishing to receive funds from the drive, such as Plaintiff,
may receive funds by applying to the W ashington area united fund. Plaintiff filed suit,
arguing that the Executive Order was an unlawful delegation o f authority by the President
o f the United States.

112
Bee id. at 19 (citing U nited B lack Fund. Inc. v. H am pton, 352 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.D.C.
1972)): /;.//. Vo/mLn
Co. v. .SEC, 198 F.2d 690. 695 (2d Cir. 1952).
113
352 F. Supp. 898 (1972).
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The court rejected P la in tiffs claim. It observed that the federal agency responsible
for local charitable organizations did not unlaw fully delegate its authority to determine
charitable solicitation privileges because the agency retained sufficient oversight; it required
the private entities to meet independent federal standards such as nondiscrimination
standards."^ The court reasoned that:
Certainly it would be an abuse o f discretion for the Chairm an to surrender all
authority over the policies o f United W ay and its m em ber united funds and chests,
but it seems clear from the record . . . that this is not the c a s e . . . [A]ll local agencies
wishing to participate as m embers o f a united fund or com m unity chest in the
Com bined Federal Cam paign m ust m eet independent fe d e r a l standards regarding
such im portant m atters as nondiscrim ination standards, which are spelled out in the
Chairman's M anual on Fund Raising. It is apparent . . . that the Chairman retains
authority to review the policies even o f those organizations which have been
approved by United W ay to m ake sure that they do in fact meet federal requirements.
Final decision- m aking authority concerning eligibility o f federations o f local
charities . . . does not, then, rest in a private organization.""

Interestingly, the court added that the C h airm an ’s delegation was in fact
advantageous for the federal agency: “ [The] Chaim ian's "methods and standards" are not an
abuse o f discretion on any theory o f invalid subdelegation and, . . . such methods and
114

See id. at 904-05.
115

Id. at 904; see also R. H. Johnson Æ Co. v. Securities and E xchange Com mission, 198
F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.). cert, denied 344 U.S. 855 (1952) (subdelegation by federal
agency to private entity is not invalid when the federal agency or official retains final
reviewing authority); H arw ell v. G rowth Programs. Inc., 315 F.Supp. 1184, 1188
(W .D.Tex. 1970) (same).
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standards are a reasonable means o f permitting a great num ber o f local volunteer health and
welfare agencies to participate in the Com bined Federal Campaign without unduly burdening
the normal operations o f the federal government.
M ore recently, two cases have addressed the extent to which federal agencies may
delegate authority in the public lands arena.

In both cases, the court rejected the

g ov ern m ent’s delegation o f authority, finding that it was too broad. In N atural Recourse
D efense C ouncil v. M odel f

environmental and wildlife organizations claimed that the

Bureau o f Land M anagem ent (“B L M ” ) violated, among other statutes, the Taylor Grazing
Act and F L P M A when it am ended regulations for m anagement o f livestock grazing on
public lands.

At issue was the Secretary o f the Interior's "Cooperative M anagement

Agreem ents" (CMAs). U nder the CMAs, the B L M permits ranchers to graze livestock on
the public lands in a way that the ranchers deem as appropriate. The court found that the
CM A program “is contrary to Congressional intent and was enacted without proper regard
for the possible environmental consequences which may result from overgrazing on the
public lands.” "* Specifically, the court found that; “The CM A program disregards
defendants' duty to prescribe the manner in and extent to which livestock practices will be
conducted on public lands. The program also overlooks defendants' duty o f expressly
reserving, in all permits, sufficient authority to revise or cancel livestock grazing
I Ih

Id.
I 1^

618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.Cal. 1985).
1 IK

Id.
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authorizations when nccessar>.’' " ‘^ Interestingly, the cou rt's reasoning highlights an
im portant policy concern underlying collaborative decision making:
the Congressional mandate that public lands be m anaged "in a m anner that will
protect the quality o f scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and
atmospheric, water resource, and archaeological values." . . . Some or all o f these
knowledgeable permittees may even be inclined to limit their livestock grazing to
levels which will guarantee the vitality o f such values, even at the expense o f their
own private ranching interests. Had Congress left a gap in its regulatory scheme
which allowed defendants to decide whether individual ranchers should be entrusted
with such decisions, this Court would be in no position to second guess the wisdom
o f the CM A program. However, Congress, in directing that the Secretary' prescribe
the extent o f livestock practices on each allotment, precluded such entrustment,....'*^

In the second and more recent ^ase. N aiional P ark and CoNsen'ation Association i'.
Stantonk^^ the court squarely addresses the question o f appropriate delegation o f federal
decision m aking to a local council. The next section discusses the court’s interpretation o f
the unlawful sub delegation doctrine as it applied in N ational Park and C o n se n ’ation
A ssociation v. Stanton.

B. National Park and Conservation Association v, Stanton.
The U nlawful Sub D elegation D octrine
11^
Id.
12(1

Id.
121

54 F. S upp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
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The parameters o f the unlawful sub delegation doctrine as it applied to local,
collaborative decision making were tested in N ational P ark and Consci'\'ation Association
V.

Stanton}-^ At issue was whether the National Park Service ("NFS") unlawfully

delegated'"-’ its statutory duty to m anage and administer the N iobrara National and Scenic
R iver to a local private citizen group.

1. The Case

The N iobrara river, flowing through north central Nebraska, is hom e to several
threatened and endangered species and is recognized as one o f the prem ier canoeing rivers
in the countiy.'-'' The N iobrara is also unique in that a majority o f the river runs through
private land. Against a backdrop o f local opposition. Congress added sections o f the river to
the National Wild and Scenic Rivers system. As a wild and scenic river, the Niobrara falls
w ithin the National Park Service's jurisdiction.

122

54 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
122

While courts generally refer to the doctrine as the unlawful sub delegation doctrine, the
National Park and Conservation Ass'n court referred to it as the unlawful delegation tor
simplicity purposes. See id. at 18.
124

See id. at 11.
125
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from N ational P ark a n d Conservation Ass'n.
V. Stanton. 54 F. Supp. 2d. 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
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The managem ent regime for the Niobrara river evolved out o f a complex process.
C ongress first created an eleven m em ber advisor)' com mission m ade up o f local interests.
C ongress’s intent in forming the advisory com mission was to ease local hostility to the
N iobrara's designation by encouraging local and state involvem ent in designing a general
m anagem ent plan for the river. With the help o f the advisor)' com m ission, the NPS
developed a General M anagem ent Plan and Environmental Impact Statement (GMP/EIS).
The G M P framed the N P S ’s m anagem ent objectives for the Niobrara river and the EIS
outlined several managem ent alternatives. The NPS eventually chose an alternative
(“Alternative B ” ) that required a two step approach to managem ent o f the river. First, in July
1997, the N P S entered into an Interlocal Cooperative A greement (“the Agreem ent”) with
local N ebraska government entities. The Agreement then created the Niobrara Council (“the
C ouncil” ), made up o f m em bers o f county and state agencies, local landowners, a
representative from the tim ber and recreational businesses and Fish and Wildlife Service, and
one representative o f the NPS. The Council was responsible for managing and protecting the
Niobrara River according to the standards outlined in the GM P/EIS. The NPS retained
authority to terminate both the Council as well as the Agreement if the Council failed to meet
established objectives or if it m anaged the river in a way inconsistent \\ ith NPS national
environmental standards.
Plaintiffs National Parks and Conservation, Barr)' Harper, and the American Canoe
Association alleged that almost two years had passed since the NPS created the Council but
the group had yet to provide a managem ent plan to protect N iobrara’s resources.

34
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2. A nalysis
Plaintiffs alleged, among other issues, that the NPS unlawfully delegated its
m anagem ent authority to the Council.

(a) N PS' Statutory Obligations

The court initially addresses the N P S ' statutory obligations. It recognized that the
N P S ’ mission is "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild
life therein and to provide for the enjoyment o f the same in such m anner and by such means
as will leave them unim paired for the enjoyment o f future generations.'” ''’
The duties o f the Secretary o f the Interior are explained in 16 U.S.C. § 1281(c)

(1999):
The Secretary o f the Interior, in his administration o f any component o f the national
wild and scenic rivers system, may utilize such general statutory authorities relating
to areas o f the national park system and such general statutory authorities otherwise
available to him for recreation and preservation purposes and for the conservation
and m anagem ent o f natural resources as he deems appropriate to carry out the
purposes o f this chapter.''*’

A lm ost fifty years after Congress created the NPS, Congress passed the Wild and

1:6
National Park Ser\'ice Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. ^ 1 (1999).
1:7
Id. (em phasis added).
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Scenic Rivers Act in 1968 to "preser\'e [the] selected rivers or sections th ereo f in their
free-flowing condition to protect the water quality o f such rivers and to fulfill other \ ital
national conservation purposes".

(b) Advisory Commission

The court recognized that the advisory commission, designed and implemented by
Congress, was a lawful extension o fth e N FS's a u t h o r i t y . T h e court reasoned that Congress
knew that a majority o f the land included in the Niobrara river system was pri\ately owned,
and created the com m ission to encourage local participation in m anaging the river. Congress
did not intend to wholly shift the N FS's m anagem ent responsibilities to a private entity such
as the Council.'-" The court rejected the N F S ’s claim that, similar to the advisory committee,
the Council also fell within the scope o f acceptable subdelegation o f authority.'^'

(c) the Council

16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1999).
124
See N a tio n a l Park a n d C onservation Ass'n. 54 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
Uti
See id.
131

See id. at 20-21.
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The court then addressed whether the Council, similar to the Advisor)' Commission,
was an abrogation o f the Secretary’s duties. Applying this statutory' language to the case
here, the court first addressed the constitutionality o f the Advisory Committee. The court
found that the “statutes give the Secretary o f the Interior sole responsibility for
a d m inistering the lands included in the National Parks system and the National Wild and
Scenic Rivers system.” em phasis added. The court then interpreted"administering," as
used in the statute, to m ean "to m anage ... to direct or superintend the execution, use, or
conduct o f ... to m anage or conduct affairs. Thus, the Secretary, who is statutorily charged
with administering Park Ser\'ice lands and rivers, “cannot wholly delegate his
responsibility to a local entity which is not bound by the statutory obligations set forth
above.” The court reasoned that: “NPS cannot, under the unlawful delegation doctrine,
com pletely shift its responsibility to administer the Niobrara to a private actor, (citation
omitted), particularly a private actor whose objectivity m ay be questioned on grounds o f
conflict o f interest.” According to the court:

Plaintiffs argue that Congress created the Advisory Com m ission as the "primary
channel" for local input regarding the administration o f th e Niobrara, and that the
creation o f a local m anaging council violates the intent o f Congress. . . . [T]he
Advisory Com m ission's recommendation for the creation o f a local council can not
shield NPS from the finding that by follow ing that recommendation it m ay ha\ e
unlawfully delegated its duties to the council.'-'

I .- :

N ational P ark a n d C onservation Ass'n, 54 F.Supp. 2d
37
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As stated previously, the threshold inquir>' to determ ine whether an agency
unconstitutionally delegated its authority, is whether "Congress intended to permit the
delegatee to delegate the authority conferred by Congress." The court found no indication
in either statutes or the legislative history that Congress “ intended any \ ariation on the
doctrine o f unlawful delegation.” ^
However, because case law allows an agency to delegate its authority if it retains
reviewing authority, the next question is whether the NPS retained sufficient final
reviewing authority over the Council. According to managem ent documents, including
Alternative B, the Niobrara is to be m anaged by a local council, with NPS merely
serving as liaison and pro\ iding technical support as needed. (Citations omitted.) The
Council is responsible far hiring staff, monitoring the River resources, evaluating
access sites and land protection needs, providing educational and information
services, providing law enforcement and emergency services, and maintaining roads,
bridges, and other river access sites.
The court found that these duties “fall squarely within the Secretary's responsibilities for
m anaging the Niobrara.
Moreover, under the m anagem ent guidelines, “the Council is encouraged to seek

13. '

Id.
s:.4

Id
135

Id.
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outside sources o f funding to avoid having its decisions "dictated". . . NPS has only one
voting m em ber on the Council, and all decisions are made by majority vote.” The court
found that; “In short, it is clear that NPS retains virtually no final authority over the
actions—or inaction—o f the Council.
Therefore, the court held that the N P S ’s delegation o f its statutory m anagement
duties to the Council violated the unlawful delegation doctrine. Specifically, the court
found that:
the NPS retained no oversight over the Council, no final reviewing authority over the
council's actions or inaction, and the Council's dominant private local interests are
likely to conflict with the national environmental interests that NPS is statutorily
m andated to represent. NPS lacks the authority to: appoint or remove members o f th e
Council, aside from its own representative; determine which interests will be
represented: select Council officers; establish Council sub-committees; determine the
term limit for Council members; veto Council decisions which are contrary to the
G M P; independently review Council decisions prior to implementation; and control
Council funding. . . [Tjhe Council does not share NPS' national vision and
perspective. NPS controls only one o f th e 15 Council members, and is the only
m em ber, besides FW S, who represents national environmental concerns.'^'

Finally, although the court recognized that the NPS retained authority to dismantle
the Council completely if it failed to manage the Niobrara consistent with the plans
outlined in GM P, the court argued that “[u]se o f such a draconian weapon is highly
Ij Ci
Id.
137

Id.
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unlikely, especially since NPS claims that without local participation, it could not
effectively meet its goals and objectives because o f local opposition to federal
management."
W hile the court in N ational Park and C o n se n ’ation A ssociation v, Stanton rejected
the N PS decision to delegate its authority to a local council, Congress took an opposite
approach when it legislated the Quincy Library Group. The next section discusses
Congress' mandate that the Forest Service implement a locally developed management
proposal for a large area o f national forest land in the northern Sierra Nevada Mountains.

C. The Q uincy L ib ra iy Group: C ongressional Legislation
o f a Citizen Initiated M anagem ent Plan

In October 21,19 98 , less than a year before the district court decided Stanton, Congress
passed the “Herger-Feinstein Quincy Librar}' Group Forest Recovery Act (“the Act”), ” a
locally designed proposal for managing 2.5 million acres o f national forest land in the
northern Sierra Nevada M ountains.'-’ Congress passed the Act as part o fth e Department o f
the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act.'"*" The Act requires the Forest Service
to implement a locally developed managem ent plan for an area o f land covering the entire

IJ..S

Id
See Cestero, supra note 2, at 5.
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See Cestero, supra note 2. at 5.
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Plum as and Lassen National Forests and the Sierraville District o f the Tahoe National
Forest.
The Act was a product o f the Quincy Library' Group ("QLG"), a local citizen group
initially organized by a timber industry forester, a county supervisor, and an environmental
attorney who wanted to tackle the contentious environment in Quincy, California brought
on by the tim ber wars o f the early 1990’s .‘‘^’ The "tim ber w a rs'w e re the result o f dramatic
changes in tim ber harvest levels in Lassen and Plum as counties, and surrounding areas,
com bined with an increased environmental awareness. The controversy was also fueled by
concerns over the extinction o f the California spotted owl. By 1993, the Q LG had developed
a “C om m unity Stability Proposal,” which included recom m endations for maintaining a

141

See Cestero, supra note 2, at 5.
See id By 1999, tim ber production from QLG national forests was barely 10% o f th e
1980’s levels. A sharp decline in timber-related economic activity and employment
coincided with the declining harvest levels. According to a QLG case study:
the Forest Service found itself in a dilemma. On one hand, each forest had only
recently adopted a Land and Resource M anagement Plan (LRM P) that called for
high tim ber production . . . and “tim ber people” felt they were entitled to the
production levels described in those plans. On the other hand . . .
“environmentalists” demanded immediate action to protect spotted owls and other
species reported to be at risk, and to preserve large old trees and roadless areas.
These contrary views expressed themselves during a two or three year period in a
sequence o f charges and counter-charges involving sabotage and tree-spiking,
demonstrations and counter- demonstrations, and even direct threats o f injury or
death.
Engaging, Em pow ering, an d N egotiating Com m unity: Strategies f o r Consciwation and
Development., The Conservation and Development Forum. West Virginia University, and
the Center for Economic Options. October 8-10, 1998.
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consistent timber supply, implementing an experimental fire control scheme, and designating
roadless and riparian areas excluded from tim ber harvesting.''^- H o w e\er, after waiting tor
almost four years for the Forest Service to implement the plan without any results, the QLG
bypassed the agency and took its proposal to Congress.'"" The House o f Representatives
passed the proposal by a vote o f 429 to

The bill initially died in the Senate after

confronting opposition from 140 environmental groups but eventually passed in October
1999 as a rider to the Om nibus appropriations bill and was never debated on the floor o f the
Senate."^
The Act directs the Secretary o f Agrieulture, acting through the Forest Service, to
conduct a 5-year pilot project to implement resource protection and management activities
outlined by the Q LG on the Plumas, Lassen, and Tahoe National Forests. The Pilot Project
focuses on the advantages o f fuel breaks, group selection, individual tree selection, avoidance
or protection o f specified areas, and riparian restoration. Specifically, the project ( 1 ) required
40,000 to 60,000 acres o f strategic fuel reduction (harvesting o f dead and diseased trees) in
fire prone areas each year; (2) required special efforts to protect riparian areas including
creation o f wide protection zones; (3) required selective harv esting techniques to achieve

IJ3
See Cestero. supra note 2, at 5.
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multi age, multi-story, varied species forest: and (4) banned all logging in certain
environmentally-sensitive areas.
The legislation also explicitly states that “ [njothing in this section exempts the pilot
project from any Federal environmental law.” As such, the Forest Service is required to
com plete an env ironmental impact statement to analyze the effects o f the management
proposals before it implements any managem ent activities.
The QLG has generated considerable controversy,'"*' and because o f this it is difficult
to disentangle the conflicting stories surrounding both the crafting o f the legislation and its
implications.

However, it appears clear that the QLG closed meetings that at one time had

been open to the public. The Group also excluded interested stakeholders, most notably the
Forest Service, as well as several local and national environmental groups involved in the
region's forest m anagem ent issues.'"*'* Without the input o f the diverse, and often, opposing
views, opponents characterize QLG as a ‘“collaborative advocacy group,”"''® more concerned
with lobbying for congressional support than with being inclusive o f all affected interests.'"
Still others accuse the coalition o f advancing the Sierra Pacific Industries timber company
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agenda at the expense o f local needs,'-- and they have condem ned the proposal as "'another
sweetheart deal for California's largest tim ber com pany.”'
It is argued that large timber com panies support the Act because o f the degree o f
certainty it provides; permitting tim ber harc esting without the legal challenges and appeals
from environmentalists. Som e local environmentalists support the Act because it ensures
environmental restrictions that may not have been possible. However, support is not
universal. Ranchers do not view the Q LG as representative o f local interest. They oppose
the Act because according to one spokesperson, “it appears to grant the Forest Service
sweeping new authority to violate established water rights and to limit or even terminate
grazing within the pilot project area during the term o f the program.”

National

environmental interests are skeptical as well; how representative o f the national interest is
a local m ovem ent? The QLG is an often cited example o f both the benefits and pitfalls o f
collaboration.

And w hile it m ay be redundant to add to this discussion, it is important

nonetheless, for the very reason that QLG has garnered so m uch attention: despite o n e’s
opinion o f the Q LG and it’s legislation, it represents a major shift in the way public lands
have traditionally been managed.

u:
See Cestero, supra note 2, at 76.
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IV. The Future o f Collaborative Decision M aking and
the Scope o f Its Authority on Public Lands

Throughout the history o f the West, westerners have often sanctioned environmentally
destructive and economically untenable solutions to the question o f who should control
natural resources.'^’’ Therefore, because o f this history, a collaborative decision making
process driven by local participation should be approached cautiously.'^- The parameters o f
collaborative decision m aking must be well defined both in terms o f what is legally
appropriate and politically acceptable.
This section discusses the positive role o f collaboration as a tool to address natural
resources decision m aking while acknowledging the potential challenges collaborative
groups m ay encounter. Although these ideas are not new,''*’ they provide the political
fram ework necessary for understanding the influence and ramifications o f collaborative
decision making. Following this discussion, this section then analyzes the limited and
conflicting legal boundaries o f collaboration. Finally, this section concludes by advocating
a formal process for collaboration efforts on public lands, based on the Forest Service

''LSee Coggins, supra note 15. at 604.
Snow, supra note 5. at 2.
15(>
See g en era lly The N ext West, supra note 1 (discussing changes in western politics,
dem ographics and economy); Cestero. supra note 2 (discussing collaboration on public
lands); A W o lf in the Garden: The land Rights M ovement and the N ew Environmental
Debate (Philip D. Brick & Cawle} R. M cGreggor eds.) (1996) (discussing changes in
public land m anagem ent in the West).
45
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proposed rules. After almost a decade o f ad hoc collaborative efforts across the West, ' this
proposal provides a structure that separates the good from the bad, the tiaily collaborati\ e.
democratic decision making from the attempts to assert fractious local control under the
guise o f collaboration.

A. C ollaboration on P ublic Lands:
Current O pportunities fo r P ublic Participation

Collaboration has the potential to play a positive role in expanding the parameters o f
natural resource decision making. First, collaboration provides an opportunity to perform
politics m ore effectively.'^* That is, despite the hopes o f Progressive Era conservationists,
decisions regarding natural resources are highly political—the majority o f laws created to
manage public lands foster politicized decision m aking.’"^ Instead o f trying to remove
politics from the decision making process, collaborative decision making attempts to
improve politics. ' Collaborative groups become political structures that are more responsive
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See The Next West, supra note 1, at 186.
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and able to integrate local i n t e r e s t s . I n this way, collaborative decision making offers
opportunities to experiment with a revival o f Jeffersonian dem ocracy,"’- in which citizens
negotiate face-to-face for solutions that affect them directly."’-' Unlike "remote-control
g overnance,”"’’^ collaborative decision making provides accountability;"’- local westerners
b ecom e responsible for the decisions they make about the lands and resources in their
com m unities."’*' The result is, therefore, not anti-government but instead, a more democratic
approach to federal decision m a k in g ." '
Furthermore, the sense o f local responsibility that collaborative groups foster may prove
m ore effective at resolving public land issues com m only left to the agencies. While many
o f the m ore intractable issues such as mining are probably beyond the scope o f

Inl
See The N ew West, supra note 1. at 186.
16:
See The N ew West, supra note 1, at 185.
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See g en era lly Daniel Kenimis. Com m unity and the Politics o f Place 113 (1990)
(analyzing rev i\al o f Jeffersonian democracy).
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collaboration,'^^ issues that are likely to gather widespread support, such as improving fish
habitat, are more appropriate for collaborative decision making. Therefore, w hen opposing
interests, joining together around a com m on desire, negotiate individual demands into a
w orkable agreement, they create a powerful coalition.'**' As these groups maneuver their way
through the negotiation process, “they overcom e residual opposition through the politics o f
inclusion."'^* Divisiveness is more likely integrated into the decision making process. ' ' This
suggests that agreements developed by collaborative groups m ay be acceptable to a majority
o f the interested parties and less likely to encounter opposition.
Even in situations where collaboration fails to produce a tangible product, the effort is
worthw hile because collaboration, when done correctly, builds comm unity bonds and lays
the foundation for future problem solving.'^- These successes are well documented and their
impacts should not be underestim ated.’'^ The process o f working together on a common
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See Snow, supra 5. at 8.
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See The N ew West, supra note 1, at 195.
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lands); A W o lf in the Garden, supra note 156 (discussing changes in public land
m anagem ent in West).
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issue m ay foster trust and understanding among citizens who have traditionally remained
alienated, particularly in com m unities where resource extraction dominates the local
econom y.''^ The result is a situation that is more likely to promote, rather than discourage,
dialogue, and in the future m ay lead to tangible problem solving on difficult issues. While
the Quincy Library Group fails to provide a w orkable model for collaborative decision
making, critics applaud the group for its success in mending some o f the divisiveness that
plagued the com m unity in the early 1990s.'^‘’
M ost importantly, collaborative decision making has gathered such momentum that it
is unlikely to fade from the political landscape in the near future. Since the early 1990s,
collaborative groups have ballooned, and arguably, collaborative decision making has
gathered enough widespread support that it constitutes a new environmental m o v e m e n t.'''
Nationally, collaborative decision making is heralded as a solution for addressing difficult
resource allocation q u e stio n s.'" Even if national politics turned against collaboration, it is
unlikely that these efforts would dissolve. Having given local citizens increased influence
over participation in the decision making process, federal land managem ent agencies risk
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See id.
175

See Quincy Librar>' Group Forest Recovery and Economics Stability Act o f 1997:
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disenfranchising these groups by withdrawing support. Because oscillations o f western anger
directed at the federal government have dominated public land politics since the turn o f the
century/"* this is an outcom e the federal government should not risk.'"''
However, challenges to collaborative decision m aking do exist. George Coggins
highlights three major concerns. First, collaboration is susceptible to co-option by powerful
interest groups.'*" Second, collaboration agreements m ay contradict national priorities.'*'
Third. Coggins is reluctant to trust local westerners to do the right thing if given expanded
influence over decision making.'*" Coggins argues that “[fjrom the birth o f the Nation, local
citizens have banded together, usually at the expense o f the general public and often with the
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See generally A W o lf in the Garden, supra note 156 (discussing changes in public land
m anagem ent in West): Cawley R. McGreggor, Federal Land. Western Anger; The
Sagebrush Rebellion and Environmental Politics (1993) (discussing histor>' o f anti-federal
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In each o f these "movements." western interest groups sought to obstruct federal
m anagem ent o f public resources by asserting local control. While these "movements"
eventually dissolved, they succeeded in disrupting m anagem ent o f natural resources and
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connivance o f federal and local officials,

Therefore, while p o s iti\e outcomes may result

from collaborative decision making, collaborative groups, unchecked, ha\ e the potential to
frustrate their primary^ objectives by encouraging local control instead o f local participation.
Consequently, formalizing the collaborative process through agency regulations provides the
safeguards against these concerns while also encouraging the flexibility and creativity that
fueled collaborative decision m aking initially.

B. H ow M uch Is E nough ? D efining the L egal Boundaries
o f C ollaborative D ecision M aking A uthority

As this Paper suggests, collaborative decision making is a recent phenomenon and runs
counter to public land law and custom and, thus, its legal boundaries remain u n c l e a r . T h i s
section analyzes the contradicting precedents outlined in the previous section.

I. The Q uincy L ih ra iy Group

There is no doubt that Congress has the authority to legislate the Quincy Library Group
(“Q L G ” ). But is legislating a locally-driven proposal, such as the QLG proposal, to manage

I.S 3
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See su p ra Part II and III.
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huge tracts o f land a good idea from both a resource m anagem ent and collaborative decision
making perspective?

This Paper argues that C on gress’ decision to implement the Q L G 's

proposal, and in so doing, working outside o f existing public land laws and regulations,
establishes an unacceptable precedent. In codifying the QLG proposal. Congress suspended
both the National Forest M anagem ent Act (“N F M A ”) and the National Environmental
Protection Act (“N E P A ”).'^- As one practioner observed, “ [t]his case demonstrates most
clearly that these consensus processes are designed to be implemented; they are not input.
. . . they are intended to shape policy.” '**’

(a) P iece-m eal approach

The Q L G sets the precedent that collaborative groups m ay accomplish through
congressional legislation what they could not achieve under existing public land laws. The
Q L G model, thus, allows citizen groups to bypass public land laws that stand in the way o f
their proposal, at least at the initial stages. This critique highlights a critical aspect o f
collaborative decision making: it must be integrated into the current public participation
process, and should not replace existing regulations and laws.'*'’

supra Part III.
186
M ichael Mccloskey, Problem s w ith Using C ollaboration to Shape Environm ental Public
Policy, Valparaiso University Law Review, Spring, 2000.
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The QLG highlights a critical problem with collaborative decision m ak in g -p iec e
meal approach to resource management. By legislating the Q LG proposal. Congress allow s
a local group o f citizens to make decisions about a specific area, and the likely result is a lack
o f consistency in how public lands and resources are managed. John Leshy, Professor o f
Law at Arizona State University and former Solicitor o f the U.S. Department o f the Interior,
expressed his concern with this approach recently:
O ne question is how strong is the value o f having some uniformity and
consistency o f m anagem ent across an entire national system o f lands
(e.g.. national forests, national parks) by a single institution (the U.S. Forest Seiwice;
the National Park Service), and how big a threat to that value is the fragmentation
inherent in these arrangements. And how strong is the competing value o f
experim enting wi th different m anagement models, and in giving institutions
like the U.S. Forest Service and National Park Sendee some competition
in how units o f their systems are managed?

At the root o f this concern is whether these piecemeal approaches fragment uniform
control, and moreover, prevent compliance or coordination with broader management plans
at the large ecosystem level. “ Such a devolutionary approach faces a number o f potentially
vexing problems, perhaps most notably those associated with . . . adequate attention to the
regional dim ension o f environmental problem s

Environmentalists also have echoed

I XX

John Leshy, P ublic L ands, The American Law Institute, February' 13-15, 2002.
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this concern; they fear that Q L G ’s decision to lobby Congress and avoid Forest Service
participation in the m anagem ent plan creates a “precedent o f piecemeal legislation for
individual forests that would inevitably lead to the o\ er-riding o f environmental law s ” '’'"
W hile critics o f the current resource managem ent system argue that de-centralized
decision m aking is c r i t i c a l , n a t i o n a l environmental and ecological concerns should provide
an overarching framework to any decentralized refonn. Congressionally mandated
collaborative efforts are especially problematic for the National Park Service because o f the
unique language contained in the National Park Service Organic Act o f 1916,'’- the
authorizing statute for the National Park Service.'"- Because the Act authorizes individual
parks separately,” '’ the Q LG approach, unfettered, could lead to a series o f individually
m anaged parks, limiting, beyond what is desirable, a uniform, national policy for managing
national parks.
This is not an isolated concern.

One legal scholar warned against any efforts by

a n d (he D evolution o f U.S. F ederal Environm ental Programs, Natural Resource Journal,

2000 .
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Congress to allow local comm unities “to have either nominal or o\'ert control over park
policies.’’ As an example, he cited a congressional proposal in 1996, which created an
eleven-m em ber intergovernmental council to make m anagem ent recommendations for
Voyageurs National Park. The NPS would be allowed only one representative on a council
m ade up largely o f local and state officials.

In the end, Congress did not enact the

legislation, principally, because: “ [ojpponents o f the plan voiced concerns that a delegation
controlled by local officials would likely allow increased recreational use o f the park, which
would, in their estimation, com prom ise the environmental integnty o f the park.” ''^(b) N ational P articipation
From the standpoint o fn o n -lo ca l populations, oftentimes an environm ental decision has
regional or national im plieations, either because the decision directly affects an
environm ental resource that a wide range o f non-local stakeholders perceive as a
national good, or because the decision indirectly shapes decisions about other resources
in non-local areas.
Politically, the QLG m odel is unsupportable. The QLG proposal represents local control
instead o f collaboration between local, regional, and national interests. While the difference
is subtle, it is important. By excluding interests groups that m ay have been unwilling to
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support the proposal, QLG violates a fundamental principle o f public land and resource
m anagement. The evolution o f public land law has created a system in which the remaining
federal lands are so sufficiently valuable that they should remain under federal management
and, as such, must consider national interests. Consequently, planning on federal lands must
embrace more than just local opinion; the allocation o f national resources is not a singularly
local issue.
This criticism raises another major concern that emerges from the QLG; how to ensure
broad stakeholder participation, specifically, national environmental representation.
Arguably, the lack o f participation by national environmental groups and federal agencies,
either because they were not invited or chose not to attend, had

the dual effect o f

consolidating national policy v, ith a few local people while at the same time increasing the
control o f those interest such as industry, that are welcome to p a r t i c i p a t e . A t the veryleast, limiting representation may re-distribute negotiating power between environmentalists
and industry. Worse, it m ay disenfranchise interests, such as the national environmental
groups, that do not participate.
It is well docum ented that larger enviromnental groups view collaboration with
suspicion.” *

Central to their concerns is, who speaks for the national environmental
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interest? As one environmentalist observ ed:
Spokespersons for the relevant national groups might be appointed, but it would not be
convenient or econom ically feasible for them to attend frequent meetings in far-off
places. Surrogates might also be chosen from am ong local sympathizers, but how can
they be legitimated as representatives in fact? The national groups might not agree that
they will faithfully represent their interests. In m any cases, only a limited portion o f the
interested parties will reside in the locality involved.

The result that emerges is a pow er shift; disenfranchisement o f urban constituency, who
like their local counterparts, recreate and appreciate public lands, in favor o f local interests.
Similarly, as one critic observed, the potential exists that the economic interests o f the
citizens closest to the land or resource at issue would be preferenced over the non-economic
interest o f urban interest groups. Public lands are still public, QLG is a power shift that is
legally and culturally unsupportable.
By limiting participation, the QLG created an unequal distribution o f negotiating power
that favored industry over resource, land, and species protection. In fact, it is argued that
local groups such as the QLG
provide[] industry factions with yet another arena in which to assert their interests.
According to critics, such groups provide industry organizations with a means o f
avoiding the costs and rigors o f national lobbying and negotiating by giving them
access to m ore easily controlled local forums. This, in tutn, results in an easily

!94
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exploited means o f promoting the interests at the expense o f the environment.-'

Com pounding this fear, is the concern that small environmental groups may not be able
to sufficiently represent national concerns, particularly because they have less resources than
many o f the other stakeholders. And the effect than may be reduced negotiating power. Or
alternatively, local groups m ay be influenced by the majoritarian views o f the local
com m unity where they live, particularly because m any western communities are still
dependant on the revenues that flow from resource industries.
The

presence

of

strong

government

participation-in

the

form

of

agency

representation-has been suggested as one solution. As one advocate argued, federal agency
representations “will be essential in achieving a balance between concerned parties and
ensuring that all interested stakeholders are invited to the negotiating table, preventing wellentrenched groups from abusing the collaborative decision-making process.” However, this
solution is flawed as well. According to David H. Getches, Professor o f Natural Resources
Law at the University o f Colorado School o f Law, “federal agencies are supposed to enforce
the laws rather than facilitate compromise. W hen a federal agency plays the role o f a
facilitator, it can blur the bright line o f what should and should not be permitted under
federal law .”-^" Furthermore, federal agencies have often failed to fulfill their role as neutral

M atthew Schuckm an, M aking the H ard Choices: A Collaborative Governance M odel fo r
the B iod iversity Cotxtext. W ashington University Law Quarterly, Spring 2001.
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participants concerned with safeguarding national interests. As such, unlike what happened
in the QLG, agencies must be required to participate. However, this argument is flaw ed.
Federal resource agencies have often failed to demonstrate a commitment to national or
often, ecological concerns.
M ore importantly, com pliance with NEPA m ay provide the most effective answer to
ensuring broad national participation. If, in fact, the Q L G proposal must survive an HIS
analysis before the Forest Servdce implements the managem ent guidelines, the possibility for
broad, national input exists during the com m ent and appeal stages. However, even this
outcom e has its limitations. If, as discussed previously in the N E PA section, the law only
requires the agencies to consider, but not necessarily implement public input, reviewing
agency decisions by national interests may not be enough.

(c) A gency Participation
Congressional legislation o f the Q L G ’s proposal acts as a revocation o f Congress’
delegation o f authority to federal land managem ent agencies. Under the QLG approach.
Congress creates a system in which it, and not the trained professionals, manage a small area
o f land almost 2,000 miles away from W ashington D C. The repercussions o f this decision
are huge. Congressionally mandated managem ent may transform federal agencies into
passive participants on public lands rather than driving forces behind policy and regulations.

Locctl D ecisions E clipsed the States 'R ule?, Stanford Enxironmental Law Journal
January', 2001.
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W hile the Q LG excluded the Forest Serv ice entirely, even collaboratives that allow agencies
to participate equally with other stakeholders m ay be problematic for the reasons addressed
above. The flip side to this, however, may be appealing to politicians. Limited involvement
by agencies absolves politicians from having to resolve contentious environmental issues,
as was the case with the QLG and the spotted owl, by simply deferring to citizens to find a
solution.

In effect, the QLG provided "an easy w ay out." Based on this observation, QLG

emerged as a politically expandable opportunity for politicians to defer extremely difficult
decisions over the tension between spotted owl extinction and timber harvesting to a group
o f local citizens.
Alternatively, by excluding the Forest Service, the QLG suggests that government is
simply another stakeholder, and “not the body that represents all stakeholders,... an absence
o f distinctive expertise in both agencies and government and that more expertise resides in
casually assembled groups o f stakeholders.” M ost significantly, non-participation by the
Forest service suggests that local citizens felt that “while the governm ent may still have
p ow er to enforce a decision, it lacks any special legitimacy to make decisions. Apparently,
governm ent is no longer viewed as having any right to exercise authority by virtue o f the
democratic process that chooses the office holders who direct government.”'"'
(d) F a ilu re o f D em ocracy
Lastly, the QLG m ay represent what one national environmentalist described as a failure
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o f democracy. Although an in depth analysis o f this notion is beyond the scope o f the Paper,
a b rief discussion is important.

As such, one critic o f collaborative decision making

observed that:
trying to achieve representation through service on a negotiating group, rather than
through the electorate and representative institutions, also poses problems. Most
theorists agree that all stakeholders with a real interest in the outcome ought to be
m em bers o f the group. But institutions o f representative democracy provide many more
nuanced opportunities for various interests to be heard and exert influence, particularly
through opportunities to form alliances in the electoral and lobbying processes. It is
simply not m echanically feasible to bring that m any voices to the table in a collaborative
exercise. These exercises need to be o f a workable size. Thus, in practice, fewer voices
can be heard.
Interestingly, critics o f that the QLG approach, and collaboration generally, who fear
that these efforts bypass the democratic process, often focus on concerns that collaboration
disenfranchises national interests. Similar to the arguments stated above in the discussion o f
national representation, one opponent expressed concern that: “Instead o f issues being
decided by majorities or pluralities in a nationwide constituency, decisions would be made
in the context o f small, dispersed constituencies."'"'^ And furthermore, “ [tjhe power o f such
constituencies would not be limited to local issues. Issues o f broader import would be subj ect

:i)5
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to the local communities' decisions.
Lastiy, it is worth noting that the inherent conflict o f dem ocracy may be advantageous
to environmental decision making. It has been argued that: “Full-throated debate develops
and focuses issues, generates interest in them, educates the public, and creates the will to find
solutions. . . .We do not need a tool to suppress such conflict.
Although this analysis is not entirely supportable, it raises some troubling concerns
about the Q L G approach.

2. National Park and Conservation Association v. Stanton

The court in N ational P ark and C onscn'arw n Association v. Stanton restricted
collaborative decision unduly tlrrough its interpretation o f the unlawful sub delegation
doctrine. B y rejecting the National Park Service’s ("NPS") authority to delegate its authority
because it did not retain significant oversight, the court’s holding is inconsistent with the case
law. In U nited B lack Fund. Inc. v. Hampton,-'^'’ the court agreed that the Chairman o f the U.S.
Civil Service Com m ission did not violate the unlawful sub delegation doctrine even though
the C o m m issio n’s reviewing authority was limited to ensuring that the pri\ate citizens’

:ri5
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-^'’See U n ited B lack Fund, Inc. v. Hampton.. 352 F. Supp. 898 (1972).
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council complied with broad federal regulations.-"" The court did not seem to be concerned
that the citizens operated without significant oversight from the federal agency.-"'' Therefore,
applying this holding to the facts in Stanton, the court incorrectly held that the NPS
unlawfully delegated its authority. Similar to the com m ission in U nited Black Fund, the NPS
retained oversight o f the Council; the NPS oversaw the C ouncil’s compliance with the
federal standards outlined in the GM P/EIS and retained the authority to dismantle the
Council if it failed to meet these requirements. Therefore, the Council operated within
national environmental and land use planning laws. While this oversight is extremely
limited, it falls within the broad parameters outlined in the case law.
Politically, the court’s decision is unacceptable as well. A majority o f collaborativ e
groups operate outside o f the federal agency’s oversight.-'" Comm only, federal agents act as
participants with equal voting rights as citizens, other agencies, and local government
officials. Generally, citizens structure the proposals and dictate the agenda to reflect
participants’ interests. Therefore, applying the N ational P ark and C o n sen ’ation court’s
requirem ents that agencies avoid violation o f the unlawful sub delegation doctrine by
significantly increasing their involvement in collaborative groups is likely to diminish the
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2. at 5.
63

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

enthusiasm for, and am ount of, collaboration efforts. Agencies cannot afford the time and
m oney it would take to participate at the level the court requires. Furthermore, it is probable
that local participants will resent the paternalistic role the Stanton court's holding forces on
the agencies—collaboration grew out o f a desire to w ork outside o f traditional decision
making schemes in which citizens, and not federal agents, directed the process. Therefore,
to create a framework based on the co urt’s holding tlireatens to circum\ ent reform that
collaborative decision m aking attempts to provide. Agency oversight is significant at the
im plem enting stage o f a citizen proposal. That is, the agency must retain authority to reject
the citizen driven proposal; oversight is extended too far if it demands more than that.
However, the council pushes the boundaries o f collaboration extremely close to local
control. B y excluding representatives from national organizations with interests in the
Niabrara River, it is less likely that the council will adequately represent national concerns
in its m anagem ent decisions. Because the Niabrara is part o f the federal land system, this
outcom e is unacceptable. Nationally held lands cannot be managed by local control only.
Therefore, some aspects o f the council provide a workable model for collaborative decision
m aking; the council operates within federal laws and the NPS retains the discretion to
terminate the council i f it acts inconsistently with national conser\'ation standards. However,
the council’s reliance on local participation falls short o f a successful collaboration by failing
to adequately represent national interests.-" At the ver>' least, a stronger federal agency

Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Funding O ur N ational Parks in the 21"' Century: Will Jf'c Be Able
to P re se n 'e a n d Protect O ur E m battled N ational P a r k s Fordham Environmental Law
Journal, Fall 1999.
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presence on the Council would be more able to address the issue o f national representation.
The court's decision clearly demonstrates that the NPS may not delegate unlimited
m anagem ent discretion to local entities. However, as one legal scholar observ ed, the court,
“does hint at a permissible m anagem ent scheme that would allow local officials to participate
in m anagem ent decisions.”- ’- Accordingly, under such a scheme, “( 1 ) the NPS would have
to retain broad oversight authority over any council; (2) the council would have to have more
NPS representatives; and (3) the representatives o f local commercial and landowners would
be limited.”-'" A successful collaboration between the NPS and local entities would therefore
likely require the NPS to create a group loosely based on the Council, but dominated by NPS
representatives, and where the N PS has extensive oversight control. Local involvement
could exist at a secondary level; “The council could then establish several subcommittees
chaired m ainly by local officials, “thereby allowing active participation by these officials in
m anagem ent o f the park.”-'^
It is also important to note that in the two years since the Council was created, it failed
to adopt any type o f m anagem ent plan-even prelim inarily-for the River.

Perhaps, the

c o u rt’s decision may have been more a reaction to the total lack o f management rather than
a finding o f constitutional violation.

By analyzing the case from this perspective, it is

Id.
213
Id
Id
65

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

possible to distinguish Stanton on its facts, and as such, isolate it from pre\ ious line o f
delegation cases. Arguably, Stanton should be read narrowly and limited to its facts.
Furthermore, a legal analysis o f collaboration should recognize that where the agency retains
sufficient reviewing authority through compliance with federal laws and regulations, and the
authority to unilaterally reject proposals, is in line with the case law. Perhaps, the strength
o f S ta nton is its detailed analysis that taken in light o f H am pton, provides a w orkable
fram ew ork-adm inistrators cannot completely delegate, that is, cannot completely shift their
responsibilities without sufficient reviewing authority.
The court however, does identify troubling issues. The Council failed to develop any
meaningful proposal, lacked any oversight and independent review by the agency prior to
im plem entation o f a m anagem ent plan, had extremely limited national vision and
perspective, and m ay have chose a managem ent plan in conflict with national environmental
issues.

Each o f these concerns is unique to the land and resource management arena,

concerns which previous delegation cases did not face.
In a final analysis, the Stanton court addresses real concerns about unlimited delegation
to local entities. The court correctly rejected the N F S ’s authority to delegate such broad
pow er in light o f the C o un cil’s failure to develop any m anagem ent plan. However, as the
line o f cases have found, requiring compliance with federal laws such as NEPA and the ESA,
and providing agency reviewing authority may go a long way in addressing the concerns that
the Stanton court identified.
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3. A M o d el o f C ollaborative D ecision M akin

This section suggests an alternative to the informal, a d hoc structure o f collaborati\ e
efforts in public land decision making. Specifically, collaboration should be incorporated
into federal land m anagem ent guidelines on a short term, experimental basis, incorporating
the criticisms o f the Q uincy Library' Group proposal and the Stanton court decision. While
collaboration is not appropriate for all land and resource issues, a formal structure should
include collaboration as one o f several approaches to decision making.
First, the role o f collaboration in federal decision making should be explicitly stated:
collaborative groups should offer input and not make policy, a central criticism o f the QLG.
Therefore, collaborative proposals are merely recommendations to the agency at the scoping
stage and not the implem enting stage. Furthermore, collaboration efforts should function
within existing public land laws. That is, collaboratives must com ply with regulations and
policies set in place to direct m anagem ent o f the public lands. For instance, all citizen driven
proposals m ust first go through the citizen review process m andated under NEPA. As
Getches observed, requiring agency participation in the process is m ore likely to ensure that
citizen driven proposals are consistent with the national environmental standards. Finally,
the end result should be merely input “not a finished product needing only official
ratification.”’' " Collaboratives are an additional forum for public input, supplement the notice
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and com m ent and hearing processes already in place.
Alternatively, as advisors to the federal agencies, col!aborati\es retain some
independence from the agencies and therefore are less likely to be captured by an agency. ■
“M ost o f the advantages o f problem-solving through group discussion can be obtained
w ithout retreating from the norms o f a representative democracy, without denying the claims
o f national majorities and disenfranchising urban populations. [Collaboration] should simply
be added to the tool kit for public participation, . . .
W hile the unlawful sub delegation doctrine provides limits to collaboration, final
reviewing authority m ust be interpreted broadly. Because collaboration is an experiment,
agencies m ust have both the opportunity to participate as at least equal members but also
retain the discretion to reject proposals, even in cases where agency participation and
oversight is limited. By limiting the amount o f agency participation, local citizens may
continue to craft creative approaches to managing natural resources without overly burdening
the agencies.
Lastly, national interests must be included. As this Paper has suggested, the issues facing
federal

lands

are

fundamentally

national

issues.

W hile

local

citizens

may

be

disproportionately effected, national concerns must be included in the process. As stated
earlier, agency participation as well as compliance with N E PA and other environmental laws
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pro\'ide opportunities to consider national interests.
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VI, Conclusion

O ver the past decade collaboration efforts have taken hold across the West. For many
participants in collaborative efforts, collaboration offers an alternative to status quo
m anagem ent on federal lands by engaging the citizens most directly affected by natural
resource allocation in the decision making process. While criticism o f collaboration is
widespread, this Paper suggests that because o f the rapidly increasing support for
collaboration, it will rem ain a force on the political landscape.
However, the scope o f collaborative authority is unclear. Congressional action and court
decisions outline contradictory and inconclusive parameters. In 1999, Congress mandated
the im plem entation o f a local citizen group proposal to manage a large area o f Forest Service
land in northern California. Less than a year after Congress passed the citizen group
proposal, the D C. District Court unequivocally rejected the National Park Serence's decision
to delegate m anagem ent authority for the Niobrara Wild and Scenic River to a local council,
finding that the agency had violated the unlawful sub delegation doctrine.
These decisions fail to define an appropriate level o f authority for collaboration. By
legislatively mandating the Quincy Library Group proposal, Congress legislated too much
control to local citizens; the allocation o f natural resource interests extends beyond the local
com m unity. However, the court’s decision in Stanton m ay unduly restrain collaboration by
narrowly defining the boundaries o f unlawful sub delegation. Therefore, this Paper suggests
that a formal structure outlining the limits o f collaboration is both necessary and worthwhile.
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W hile this m ay pose a risk, if collaboration is to be truly tested and the potential benefits, as
well as challenges, realized, federal regulations guiding the decision making process should
include specific guidelines outlining the role o f collaboration. A formal structure should
address the criticisms o f both the QLG model and the Stanton case. Consequently,
collaboration should exist within public land laws—legislating citizen initiatives that bypass
existing laws is a dangerous precedent. Second, the courts should interpret the sub delegation
doctrine to allow agencies flexibility in both the extent o f their involvement as well as the
consideration they attach to collaboratively driven recommendations.

And in the end,

collaboration m ay becom e one o f the several approaches to address the difficult question o f
who decides the allocation o f federal natural resources.
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